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Abstract 
Nonprofit organizations offer a wide range of goods and services and seek 
funding from a variety of revenue sources.  Our working theory n this paper is that the 
sources of funding are related to the services a nonprofit provides – specifically whether 
services are public, private, or mixed in the nature of their benefits. Using multiple 
subfields from three major fields in the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE), 
this study divides nonprofits according to service type, and estimates the impact of 
service character on particular revenue streams and overall level of revenue 
diversification.  Generally, the proportion of revenues generated by program fees is 
lowest for the category deemed public, highest for those with mostly private benefits, and 
midway for “mixed” services which are private in character but entail  substantial public 
benefits.  Similarly, the more public a nonprofit’s services, the greater the proportion of 
revenues it generates through donations.  However, we also identify some puzzling 
results that suggest the need for continued investigation of the determinants of the 
sources and mixes of nonprofit income. 
 
Introduction 
 Studies of the revenues of nonprofit organizations focus disproportionately on 
private donations, despite the fact that this source accounts, on average, for less than 20% 
of nonprofit income (Boris & Steuerle, 2006).  Underlying much of this research is the 
notion that nonprofit organizations are essentially private suppliers of collective goods 
(Okten & Weisbrod 2000).  However, insufficient attention has been paid to other 
streams of nonprofit revenue, including earned income, and to the various combinations 
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of revenue streams supporting nonprofit organizations.  Several scholars have studied 
nonprofit revenue diversification but an overall theory, with explanatory and predictive 
power, of nonprofit dependence on different sources and mixes of income remains to be 
developed.  In this paper we examine two related issues: the connection between 
particular types of nonprofit revenue and the public/private nature of services provided by 
nonprofit organizations; and the factors determining the degree of diversification of 
nonprofit revenue.    
 Although nonprofits offer an alternative to governmental provision of goods and 
services, to say that nonprofits offer only collective goods, or even goods that are similar 
in their degrees of publicness, is an overstatement.  Recognizing this fact, Weisbrod 
(1988) proposed to capture the degree of publicness in a collectiveness index based on 
the proportion of nonprofit revenues secured through private donations.  In this study, we 
take a different approach; rather than using proportion of revenues to indicate 
collectiveness, we classify the services of nonprofits based directly on the public, private, 
or mixed nature of the goods they provide.  This classification of nonprofits then allows 
us to predict the proportions of revenues from different sources.  In addition, we 
investigate why nonprofit organizations may further diversify their income beyond what 
the nature of their services suggests.  In sum, we address two key questions:  First, how 
does the nature of the service provided affect the proportion of revenues earned from key 
revenue streams such as program fees and donations?  Second, what factors (in addition 
to the public/private nature of the service) affect the overall level of revenue 
diversification for nonprofit organizations?    
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In the following section, we review earlier research and theory pertaining to the 
sources and mixes of nonprofit revenue.  Then, we describe our theory, a set of 
hypotheses and a statistical model.  The fourth section describes our data and the process 
of selecting a sample of nonprofits in particular fields and subfields of service 
corresponding to different degrees of publicness or privateness.   Next we review our 
results and juxtapose them with expectations from theory.  We conclude with some 
implications of the findings and questions for future research. 
 
Nonprofit Sector Context 
 Nonprofit organizations are distinct from for-profit businesses in various ways 
including their ability to collect revenue from a wide variety of sources.   Potential 
sources include those generally available to the private sector such as fees for service, 
returns on investment, and government contracts.  However, nonprofit organizations are 
also capable of collecting charitable contributions from individuals, grants (from either 
the government or private foundations), and gifts in kind (as well as volunteer labor).  
The latter sources offer opportunities for income diversification generally unavailable to 
for-profit businesses.   
 Early research on nonprofit revenue often focused on charitable giving, 
paralleling the development of theory describing the nonprofit sector as a voluntary 
provider of essentially public goods (Kingma 1997; Weisbrod, 1977).  The theory of 
nonprofits as producers of public goods does not explain why we do not observe more 
free-riding1 with respect to supporting the sector, but it has been a foundation for 
                                                 
1 Free-riding occurs as a result of the non-excludable nature of public goods.  Because all individuals are 
able to benefit from the good regardless of their own contributions, it becomes rational for an individual not 
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research on crowding-out2 of one revenue source by another, involving concepts of
impure altruism and warm glow
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3 (Becker 1976; Andreoni 1989, Kingma 1997).  This 
latter work suggests that individuals experience (private) satisfaction from helping othe
in need. 
 The forgoing ideas focus on why people donate, but nonprofit organizations hav
other streams they may pursue.  In fact, the level of donations relative to other streams 
likely reflects choices by nonprofit organizations to actively pursue some streams over 
others.  A seminal contribution to this thinking, formulated originally by James (1983) 
and further developed by Weisbrod and colleagues (1998) hypothesizes that nonprofit 
managers choose combinations of preferred (public) and non-preferred (private) se
so as to maximize their own levels of satisfaction or to generate a combination of 
resources and outputs that best achieves the missions of their organizations.   M
recently, scholars in nonprofit studies have shown an increasing interest in the 
complexity of reve
(Young, 2006a).   
 A number of factors contribute to the relative dependence on alternative revenue 
streams and the degree to which nonprofits concentrate their dependence on a smaller o
 
to contribute and rely on the generosity of others.  If everyone free-rides, however, theory predicts no 
production of the public good. 
2 As reliance on one source of revenue increases, crowding out theory predicts a decline in another stream.  
For example, government funding is often said to crowd-out private contributions.  Some scholars attribute 
declines to substitution effects.  The desired level of output remains constant, and with the public sector 
funding a larger portion of the expenses, private donors are required to contribute less to achieve the same 
baseline provision.  Other scholars contend that the observed phenomenon is a result of changes in behavior 
of the nonprofit.  Once government money is received, less effort is devoted to securing private donations.  
It is worth noting, however, that evidence of crowding out is mixed, with some studies finding the 
occurrence of crowding-in, where government contributions signal to the public that a nonprofit is worthy 
of greater levels private funding.  
3 The concepts of impure altruism and warm-glow are largely a means for economists to reconcile 
charitable giving (and donations to any public good) with basic economic assumptions of self-interest.  The 
idea is that individuals donate money to causes because the act of giving makes the donor “feel good.”   
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larger number of sources.  Chang and Tuckman (1994) found that the general (NTE
service fields (such as Health, Education, or Housing) in which nonprofits operate 
account for some of the variation in the composition of their revenue portfolios.  Oth
factors include the size of the nonprofit, as measured by its asset base, indicators of
financial health such as operating surpluses, and the “commercial” or “donative
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character of a nonprofit as measured by its relative dependence on program fees versus 
donations (Chang and Tuckman, 1994).  Like Weisbrod’s (1988) collectiveness in
Chang’s and Tuckman’s (1994) measures reflect the proportion of revenues from 
alternative sources rather than a direct characterization of the nature of service p
 Some researchers have asked whether diversification is important to the 
performance of a nonprofit organization.  Frumkin and Keating (2002) concluded
there are benefits to relying on a more concentrated revenue base, such as lower 
administrative costs and fundraising expenses, and that it is unclear what effects 
diversification has on a variety of other organizational outcomes.  Nonetheless, m
nonprofits do try to diversify, and other scholars suggest that this is appropriate.
Galaskiewicz and Bielefeld (1998) assert that revenue diversification increases 
community buy-in and organizational legitimacy.  Scholars also find moderate and 
significant correlations between diversification and indicators of financial health, such as
surplus accumulation and asset base, although there is wide variation when correlations 
are estimated separately for different fields of service, including a few NTEE categories
for which correlations run counter to expectations (Chang and Tuckman, 1994).  Som
researchers have found negative correlations between diversification and the leve
 
4 Chang and Tuckman (1994) classify nonprofits as donative if at least 60% of revenue is derived from 
public and private contributions, gifts, and grants.  Commercial nonprofits, also called program service 
groups, are those in which 60% of revenues are from commercial sources such as user fees. 
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fiscal stress experienced by a nonprofit organization, supporting the notion that 
diversification is a risk-reducing strategy (Greenlee and Trussel 2000, 2002; Gronbjerg, 
1993; T
r 
 
l of a 
influence the decision-makers to mix 
these streams in particular ways (Young, 2006a).   
ng 
 
lson 
uckman and Chang 1991).   
Kearns (2006) reviewed several normative approaches to nonprofit revenue 
decision-making, positing that nonprofits are multi-stakeholder / multi-decision-make
organizations whose diverse constituents’ preferences and concerns must be melded
together in order to arrive at a satisfactory revenue mix.  Such concerns include the 
appropriateness of income sources relative to the nonprofit’s mission, the potentia
revenue stream to generate significant levels of support, the risks associated with 
particular streams, possible trade-offs among alternative sources (e.g. crowding-out), and 
the effects of a particular source on the organization’s autonomy.  Kearn’s work is part of 
a larger project that explored both the factors that drive nonprofit decision makers to one 
source of revenue over another and the factors that 
 
Categories of Nonprofit Services – Theory and Model 
 It is clear that nonprofits provide a wide spectrum of goods and services rangi
in character from pure public goods to pure private goods.  Public goods, defined by 
economists as “non-rival” and “non-excludable” (e.g., public green space) are a classic 
manifestation of private “market failure”.  Profit-maximizing firms fail to provide these
goods (or to produce them in socially optimal quantities) because it is very difficult to 
charge individuals for consuming them.  Non-excludability results in free-riding and a 
failure of consumers to reveal their preferences, resulting in under-provision (Samue
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1954).  The case of public goods is argued to justify government intervention in the 
market.  However, government intervention is not inevitable if popular support is not 
forthcoming, leaving space for nonprofit provision (Weisbrod, 1977) and various possible 
strategi   
ith 
ir 
nts or other income such as that generated 
from in
 
rivate 
 supplement these fees to acommodate 
particular (e.g., low income) target groups.   
                                                
es for support on a voluntary basis despite the free-rider problem (Olson, 1965).
For the same reason that for-profit firms are not able to charge users for public 
goods, nonprofits also have difficulty requiring users to pay amounts commensurate w
the benefits gained from consuming the good.  Goods that are not excludable by the
vary nature require a source of support other than fees; nonprofits providing these 
services must therefore rely on gifts and gra
vestments or commercial ventures.  
In contrast, some nonprofits provide essentially private goods that are rival and
excludable in nature, their services offering few benefits beyond the specific clientele 
served by the organization.  These services presumably could be provided by the p
market as well, helping to explain so-called “mixed industries” (Ben-Ner 2002).  
Nonprofits providing these private goods, therefore, are more likely to earn revenues 
through fees5, although they may structure or
 
5 Nonprofits in this category may not solely rely on program fees, especially those serving low income 
populations.  Some may implement sliding scales, while others will have to rely on contributions from 
government, private donors, or other commercial endeavors to subsidize their programs. 
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Nonrival / 
Nonexcludable 
Rival /  
Excludable 
Mixed 
Good 
Purely Private 
Good 
Purely Public 
Good 
 
Figure 1 Continuum of Nonprofit Service Provision 
 
Most nonprofit services fall between these two extremes.  They operate, for 
example, where there is market failure deriving from asymmetric information 
(Hansmann, 1987) or in areas featuring substantial externalities.   Asymmetric 
information causes consumers to prefer nonprofits as a trustworthy alternative to for-
profit providers. Externalities occur when the private market fails to internalize all the 
possible costs and benefits associated with a particular service, resulting in an insufficient 
level of service provision.  In these (mixed) cases, nonprofits can be expected to offer 
services supported by fees supplemented by other sources of income such as 
contributions or government support. 
We may also expect the degree of publicness of a nonprofit’s services to influence 
its degree of revenue diversification. In particular, nonprofits that offer a mix of public 
and private goods may be expected to combine contributions and earned income to reflect 
the relative degrees of publicness and privateness of their services, and generally become 
more diversified than those offering strictly public or strictly private type goods or 
services. 
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In addition to the degree of publicness /privateness of their services, other 
characteristics of nonprofits are relevant to determining the proportion of revenues from 
any particular source, as well as overall level of diversification.  For example, different 
fields of service are more or less sympathetic to the preferences of donors or the priorities 
of government funding.   For example, social services attract more direct government 
support than private donations but the reverse is true for the arts.  The geographic 
localities in which a nonprofit operates may reflect differences in residents’ preferences 
and needs for services, with consequent variations in tax levels and government funding 
(Brooks, 2000).  In addition, membership in a supportive network such as a regional or 
national association may also reduce risk (and hence the incentive to diversify), as 
suggested by Derryck’s and Abzug’s (2002) study of nonprofits in the New York region 
following the disaster of 9/11.   
The maturity of a nonprofit organization is also likely to affect diversification 
decisions (Kimberly and Miles, 1980).  New nonprofits confront the “liability of 
newness” (Chambre and Fatt 2002; Stinchcombe, 1965) and likely reflect the 
entrepreneurial risk taking and pragmatic cobbling together of resources of their founders 
(Young, 1985).  Their capacity to manage multiple, complex streams is limited.  Lack of 
experience may constrain the ability of young nonprofits to diversify revenues or 
generate income from investments or commercial ventures.  In contrast, a mature 
nonprofit is more likely to have gradually differentiated its sources of income over time, 
including the building of endowments to generate investment income6.   
                                                 
6 Investment returns are unique as an income stream because they are unrelated to levels of output and 
hence provide “fixed income,” independent of an organization's productivity (Bowman, Keating, and 
Hager, 2006). 
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  The size of a nonprofit organization may also influence its diversification 
behavior.    Larger organizations are likely to have greater “slack” in the form of reserve 
funds, endowments, and staff and infrastructure from which greater efficiencies can be 
squeezed in times of difficulty.  Such slack can serve as a hedge against risk, possibly 
even mitigating the pressure to diversify revenue sources or generate new income 
streams.  Finally, the overall field of service in which a nonprofit operates may affect its 
degree of diversification.  Notably, some fields or subfields may be characterized by 
greater volatility in their principal sources of revenue, leading to greater emphasis on 
diversification in order to manage risk. 
The forgoing theoretical foundations lead to two sets of hypotheses, the first 
concerning the particular sources of income on which a nonprofit depends, and the 
second concerning its degree of revenue diversification.  A principal idea that we wish to 
test here is that the intrinsic public/private character of the goods or services provided by 
a nonprofit helps determine its dependence on particular sources of revenue. In this 
relationship we stipulate two principal hypotheses, as follows:   
 HS1: Nonprofits that produce public goods rely more on donations and less on 
program revenues (fees). 
 
 HS2: Nonprofits that provide private goods rely more on program revenues and 
less on donations. .   
 
In addition, the literature suggests at least two additional hypotheses concerning reliance 
on donations versus fee revenues:  
 
HS3: Nonprofits’ reliance on particular revenue streams varies by field of 
service. 
 
HS4: Nonprofits’ reliance on particular revenue streams varies by geographic 
location (i.e., political jurisdiction)   
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Our reading of the literature also suggests that various factors, including the 
public/private nature of their services, affect the degree to which nonprofit organizations 
diversify their sources of revenue.  In particular, we stipulate the following hypotheses: 
 
 HD1: Nonprofit organizations that offer mixed public/private type services are 
likely to have a more diversified revenue mix. 
 
 HD2: Nonprofit organizations affiliated with an umbrella organization are more 
protected from risk and hence less likely to diversify their revenues.   
 
 HD3: Nonprofits that are financially more healthy, according to indicators such 
as net worth or operating surplus or deficit have more diversified sources of 
income.  
 
 HD4: The age of a nonprofit organization is positively related to its degree of 
diversification. 
 
HD5: The size of a nonprofit organization, reflecting its level of organizational 
slack, is related to its degree of diversification. 
 
HD6:  The field of service in which a nonprofit operates is associated with its 
degree of diversification.   
 
 The directionality of some of these hypothesized relationships is subject to alternative 
theoretical arguments or measures, and hence may be somewhat ambiguous.  In 
particular, it may be argued (HD2) that affiliation with an umbrella organization may not 
encourage a nonprofit to diversify its revenues, given a safety net if the initiative goes 
awry.  Alternatively, the umbrella organization may promote financial guidelines that 
encourage diversification.  Similarly, (HD3) financially healthy nonprofits may be 
healthy because they have diversified, or they may feel that because they are healthy they 
need not diversify.  So too, (HD5) organizational slack may reduce an organization’s 
incentive to diversify in order to accommodate risk or it may have grown and built up 
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slack through a strategy of revenue diversification.  The solutions to these puzzles are 
best addressed empirically. 
  
Data and Methodology 
 To test our hypotheses, we analyze data from the National Center for Charitable 
Statistics (NCCS)  which maintains a database of information from Form 990 filings by 
nonprofit organizations submitted to the Internal Revenue Service (for entities with 
revenues exceeding $25,000 in a given tax year).  Specifically, we use data from the 
NCCS’s 2003 core file which contains records on more than 289,000 nonprofits.  We are 
aware of the limitations documented in previous research (Keating and Frumkin, 2003; 
Gordon et. al. 1999) but also recognize that these data are moderately reliable in fields 
relating to nonprofit revenue structure (Froelich, Knopfle, & Pollak, 2000).   
 As noted earlier, scholars have used the proportion of revenues derived from 
particular sources to classify nonprofits as providing public or private goods (or donative 
and commercial in the case of Chang and Tuckman (1994)).  Here, however, we 
categorize nonprofits as public, private, or mixed based on their NTEE subfields.  We 
began by searching NTEE codes for three broad categories of nonprofits which could 
provide multiple subfields that would fit each of the public, private, and mixed 
categories.   
 We chose the broad NTEE categories of Arts and Culture, Human Services, and 
Health.  Appendix 1 displays the subfields chosen within these categories, along with 
their NTEE subfield codes, their representation in the sample, the category to which we 
assigned the subfield, and a brief explanation of our rationale.  In total, our sample 
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contains information on 45,143 nonprofits, of which 13% are classified as essentially 
public, 28% are essentially private, and the remaining 59% are mixed.  Appendix 2 
provides various summary statistics on this sample. 
 We next considered what sources of revenue should be included in the analysis, 
focusing on seven streams of income that are identified in the 2003 Core File7.  These 
include program revenue8, dues, net rental income, investment income, net income from 
special events, other income, and contributions9.  Approximately 90% of the nonprofits 
in our sample received revenues from more than one of the above streams, similar to th
proportion of nonprofits with multiple streams in previous studies (Chang and Tuckman, 
1994).  In addition, we adjusted total revenues to be equal to the sum of the forgoing 
components only, rather than the values given on the 990 forms which included changes 
in assets and inventory.  Because so few nonprofits rely substantially on changes in assets 
for revenues, total revenue changed relatively little from this adjustment
e 
                                                
10.  
To calculate revenue concentration, the shares (proportions) of revenue from each 
stream were calculated, squared, and summed to produce a Herfindahl index11 for each 
 
7 We emphasize the importance of focusing on income streams when choosing streams of revenue for a 
nonprofit organization.  A basic familiarity with accounting is necessary to realize that the IRS Form 990 
requires nonprofits to include changes in inventory and assets as part of their revenues for the year.  The 
problem here is that the required form essentially mixes items on the balance sheets and income statements 
of nonprofits.  For example, if a nonprofit sells a portion of its inventory, the nonprofit increases the 
amount of cash it has at its disposal.  But this is more like a transfer from one account to another and does 
not represent new income to the organization.  This is clearer when we consider the purchase of inventory 
or an increase in assets.  Essentially, these are expenditures, and thus to include the net change in assets and 
inventory as part of the nonprofits’ revenues is inappropriate. 
8 Program revenue includes government fees and contracts as well as payments by service users 
9 Contributions represent total public support, including direct and indirect support as well as government 
contributions and grants. 
10 There is, however, a significant difference in total revenues for those organizations with revenues in the 
bottom 1% of each category, but the difference between these two revenue estimates quickly declines.  The 
difference between the two median values under the two approaches to total revenue is under 1%, at 
$238,633for revenues including changes in inventory and assets and $237,067when only the above streams 
are included. 
11 The Herfendahl Index, a common measure of diversification is the sum of individual revenue streams 
squared divided by the square of total revenues: 
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nonprofit in the sample12.  While there are limitations to this index, it is one of the most 
commonly used tools for gauging diversification.  The index assumes equal weights for 
each possible stream, and while bounded by 1 on the side of complete concentration in 
one source, the lower bound is a function of the number of streams considered.  The 
minimum of the index approaches zero as the number of streams included in the 
calculations increases.  The lower the index score, the greater is the diversification of 
revenues. 
 In our sample, the average index score is 0.754, with variation among the 
different categories of nonprofits.  With an upper bound of one and a lower bound of .143 
(1/7), an average of .754 indicates that while most nonprofits rely on multiple streams, 
the relative importance of these streams varies significantly.  For most nonprofits in the 
sample, revenues are generated primarily through only a few key streams.  For example, 
if a nonprofit receives 85% of revenues from one stream and 15%from another, the 
nonprofit would have an index of .745.  Table 1 displays the average index score for each 
of the categories included in the study, along with average values across service sectors 
and degrees of publicness. 
                                                                                                                                                 
)revenue totalstream( 22∑=
j
iijIndex    
where i = Nonprofit 1, 2, …. , N and  j = revenue stream 1, 2,…J. 
  
12 Recalculating total revenue also assures that the proportions of revenue from each stream sum to 1.  
Because so many of the changes in inventories were recorded as losses, proportions calculated using this 
revenue were often misleading. 
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Table 1: Average HHI by Sector and Level of Publicness  
 Health Arts Human 
Services 
All 
Essentially Public .814 
(.202)
.732 
(.221)
.867 
(.175) 
.780 
(.215)
Mixed Public/Private .857 
(.167)
.645 
(.228)
.780 
(.201) 
.787 
(.210)
Essentially Private .895 
(.147)
.612 
(.198)
.822 
(.200) 
.671 
(.220)
All .859 
(.170)
.643 
(.215)
.806 
(.200) 
.754 
(.220)
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 The numbers in Table 1 should be interpreted with caution for two reasons.  First, 
the change in the index is nonlinear as the revenues of a nonprofit become more or less 
concentrated.  For example, suppose we compare three non-profits each with two revenue 
sources.  One nonprofit has revenue shares in the two streams equal to 0.7 and 0.3, while 
the remaining two have revenue mixes of 0.6 and 0.4, and 0.8 and 0.2, respectively.  The 
resulting index scores are 0.58, 0.52, and 0.68.  The average of the three indices, 0.593, is 
greater than the index had we used the average percentages for each stream and then 
calculated the index, suggesting that the index is skewed towards nonprofits with higher 
concentrations.  For comparison, Table 2 presents the Herfindahl scores for nonprofits in 
each category with the average shares of revenue from each source, as opposed to the 
average index score presented in Table 113.  
  
                                                 
13 Tables presenting the shares of revenue from the major sources are presented in the Appendix.  Only 
those revenue sources reported by more than half of the nonprofits are included in the tables, but all 7 
streams previously listed are included in the calculations in Table 3.  
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Table 2: Herfindahl Index Scores for a nonprofit with revenue streams equal to the 
average stream, by category 
 Health Arts Human 
Services 
All 
Essentially Public 0.485 0.370 0.682 0.444
Mixed Public/Private 0.511 0.340 0.429 0.396
Essentially Private 0..485 0.360 0.431 0.377
All 0.488 0.358 0.434 0.387
 
The index treats all revenue sources equally and does not reveal the specific 
sources in which particular categories of nonprofits may be concentrated.  According to 
our theory, the particular mix – as well as the level of diversification – may be a function 
of the service field and the nature of the good. 
Summary statistics for the pooled sample, along with disaggregated means for the 
three public/private categories and the major NTEE fields are provided in Appendix 2.  
On average, the nonprofits in the sample are 36 years old, and 95% are unaffiliated14.  
Average revenues exceed $10 million, with nonprofits holding an average of $12.7 
million in assets and $6.2 million in liabilities.  In the sample, 41.5% of revenues are 
earned, while 46% are received as contributions or gifts15.   
For each regression estimated below, we use a cluster-specific fixed effects 
method.  This is equivalent to including dichotomous variables representing (n-1) of the 
2698 counties in which sample nonprofits are located.  This method accounts for 
correlation between unobservable variables for nonprofit organizations within a county, 
                                                 
14 Remember, this sample is only of nonprofits filing tax returns and earning $25,000 annually.  Affiliation 
may also misrepresent the entire sector if some nonprofits are filing under the larger umbrella 
organizations. 
15 These figures include money from the government which we are unable to separate out based on the data 
available to us. 
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such as preferences and tax policies.  This estimation procedure addresses hypothesis 
HS4 above. 
 
Results 
 In this section, we present results from regression analyses involving three 
dependent variables: proportion of revenues from program fees, proportion of revenues 
from contributions, and the Herfindahl index of diversification.  All tables below are 
presented in the same format: The first column represents the full sample.  Each 
subsequent column presents estimates based on a different major NTEE category - Health 
(Column 2), Arts (Column 3), and Human Services (Column 4). 
Table 3: Determinants of Earned Income (within county estimates) 
 Pooled 
Sample 
Health Arts Human 
services 
Public -0.163** -0.336** 0.026** -0.286** 
 (27.58) (19.54) (3.00) (35.84) 
Private 0.083** 0.170** 0.161** -0.040** 
 (16.37) (12.27) (25.00) (3.06) 
Arts -0.024**    
 (4.81)    
Health 0.251**    
 (35.59)    
Organization Age 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000** 
 (3.94) (0.75) (1.80) (2.84) 
Unaffiliated -0.058** -0.088** 0.011 -0.028 
 (7.00) (6.06) (0.65) (1.83) 
Assets – BOY -0.000** -0.000* -0.000 -0.003** 
 (in millions) (2.86) (2.58) (1.91) (4.07) 
Liabilities-BOY 0.000 0.000 0.001* 0.018** 
 (in millions) (0.72) (0.57) (2.13) (5.45) 
Total Revenues 0.001** 0.001** 0.000 0.001 
  (in millions) (9.59) (8.85) (0.25) (0.85) 
Constant 0.425** 0.720** 0.249** 0.408** 
 (50.03) (43.41) (14.60) (27.30) 
Observations 45143 7867 16991 20285 
R-squared 0.12 0.20 0.05 0.04 
T-values are in parentheses; * is significant at the 5% level, ** 
significance at the 1% level.   
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 Table 3 presents estimates of nonprofits’ proportions of revenue generated 
through earned income, controlling for financial dimensions, characteristics of the 
service, age and affiliation, and location through the fixed effects variables.  Most of the 
independent variables significantly explain variation in the proportion of revenues from 
program fees within a specific county.  Compared to the reference group of Human 
Service nonprofits, Arts organizations rely slightly less on earned income on average, 
while Health nonprofits, on average, earn a significantly larger share of their revenues 
through payments for service provision.  Age significantly affects the proportion of 
income earned for nonprofits, although the magnitude of this variable indicates that it is 
much less important in predicting a nonprofit’s reliance on earned income.  A similar 
story holds for the assets (beginning of year) and total revenue (adjusted).  While 
significant, an increase of $1 million in adjusted total revenue increases the proportion of 
revenues that are earned through program fees by only 1/10 of a percent.  The same $1 
million increase in assets decreases the proportion of revenues earned from program fees 
by less than 1/10 of one percent.  Liabilities (beginning of year) does not have a 
significant impact on the proportion of revenues from program fees in the overall sample.  
Finally, firms that are unaffiliated with an umbrella organization rely less on earned 
income, on average, than their affiliated counterparts. 
 The first two variables in the regression, public and private, have the most 
important impacts.  In our overall sample, a nonprofit classified as providing public 
goods earns on average 16.3% less of its revenues from program fees than does a similar 
nonprofit organization classified as mixed.  Nonprofits classified as providing private 
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goods, on the other hand, exhibit a proportion of revenues from fees that is on average 
8.3 percentage points greater than a mixed nonprofit of similar age, status, and size. 
 Columns 2-4 present results from each of the service categories estimated 
separately.  For Health nonprofits, the pattern follows that of the overall sample.  Relative 
to mixed nonprofits, the proportion of revenues generated through earned income is 
33.6% lower for nonprofits classified as public, on average.  Those nonprofits offering 
services more private in nature, on average, collect 17% more of their revenues from user 
fees than nonprofits whose services are mixed in character.  A similar dependence on 
user fees is found for Arts nonprofits classified as private, although this proportion of 
revenues, on average, is only 16.1 percentage points greater than Arts nonprofits 
categorized as mixed.  Surprisingly, we also find that Arts organizations classified as 
public earn slightly more of their revenues from program fees than do mixed nonprofits.  
The latter difference, while significant, is however small in magnitude.  Finally, in the 
Human Services field, as in Health, nonprofits classified as public rely much less (28.6%) 
on program revenues, on average, than mixed nonprofits.  Unlike Health, however, 
Human Services nonprofits categorized as providing essentially private goods also rely 
less on earned income than their mixed counterparts.  While the latter difference is small, 
on average, it is also puzzling.   
 Table 4 presents parallel results for the proportions of revenues from 
contributions.  While the proportions of revenue generated from the two largest streams 
of income for nonprofits, donations and earned income (program fees), are highly 
(negatively) correlated at .82,, there remains enough of a difference that estimates are not 
merely mirror images for the two dependent variables. 
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Table 4: Determinants of Contributions (within county estimates) 
 Pooled 
Sample 
Health Arts Human 
Services 
Public 0.175** 0.435** -0.039** 0.278** 
 (28.30) (27.51) (4.22) (28.53) 
Private -0.047** -0.059** -0.137** 0.030* 
 (9.71) (5.86) (20.99) (2.27) 
Arts -0.079**    
 (15.98)    
Health -0.306**    
 (53.35)    
Organization Age -0.000** -0.000** -0.000* -0.000 
 (4.17) (2.70) (2.08) (1.95) 
Unaffiliated 0.111** 0.052** 0.200** 0.085** 
 (15.08) (4.88) (13.19) (5.75) 
Assets – BOY 0.000* 0.000* -0.000 0.001 
 (in millions) (2.55) (2.43) (0.45) (1.74) 
Liabilities-BOY -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.018** 
 (in millions) (1.09) (1.16) (1.64) (6.26) 
Total Revenues -0.000** -0.000** 0.001** 0.003** 
  (in millions) (9.70) (8.22) (2.88) (3.17) 
Constant 0.434** 0.132** 0.366** 0.447** 
 (56.84) (11.76) (22.81) (30.64) 
Observations 45143 7867 16991 20285 
R-squared 0.13 0.25 0.05 0.04 
T-values are in parentheses; * is significant at the 5% level, ** 
significance at the 1% level.   
 
 
 For the overall sample (Column 1), we do find many of the results mirror those in 
Table 3.  For example, Health nonprofits, which rely the most on earned revenues, rely 
the least on charitable donations, on average.  Arts nonprofits, on average, depend less on 
charitable donations than Human Services nonprofits, although this difference is 
reasonably small, at less than 8 percent.  Nonprofits that are not affiliated with an 
umbrella organization also rely more on contributions, and assets and total revenues are 
significant but small in their impact on contributions.  Importantly, when controlling for 
the other factors, on average, those nonprofits classified as public receive a proportion of 
their revenues from contributions that is 17.5% percentage points higher than similar 
nonprofits classified as mixed.  Moreover, the proportion of revenues received via 
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contributions for private nonprofits is 4.7% lower, on average, when compared to mixed 
nonprofits with similar characteristics. 
 The Health sample once again fits the expected pattern.  The share of revenues 
generated through contributions is significantly higher (43.5%) for those nonprofits 
classified as public, relative to those classified as mixed.  The difference between mixed 
and private nonprofits is much smaller, with nonprofits whose services are classified as 
private earning approximately 6% less from contributions, on average.  In the case of 
Arts nonprofits, we again find that the public and mixed categories are much more 
similar than are private and mixed nonprofits.  Public nonprofits actually rely slightly less 
(under 4%) on charitable contributions than mixed nonprofits, while the private Arts 
nonprofits receive 13.7% less of their revenues from private contributions than do mixed 
Arts nonprofits.  Finally, in the case of Human Services, we find that those nonprofits 
classified as private and those that are mixed are much more similar to one another than 
are those classified as public and mixed.  Human Service nonprofits classified as private 
actually receive 3% more of their revenues from contributions than those classified as 
mixed, although Human Service nonprofits classified as public receive 27.8% more of 
their revenues from contributions than those classified as mixed, on average. 
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Table 5: Herfendahl Index Scores (within county estimates) 
 Pooled 
Sample 
Health Arts Human 
services 
Public 0.060** -0.018* 0.076** 0.066** 
 (17.58) (2.18) (13.13) (12.24) 
Private -0.012** 0.040** -0.037** 0.021** 
 (4.40) (6.97) (8.18) (3.26) 
Arts -0.164**    
 (57.81)    
Health 0.049**    
 (17.11)    
Organization Age -0.000* 0.000 -0.000* -0.000 
 (2.03) (0.41) (2.31) (0.74) 
Unaffiliated 0.018** -0.019** 0.058** 0.054** 
 (4.21) (2.90) (5.70) (6.81) 
Assets – BOY -0.000** -0.000** -0.000* -0.004** 
 (in millions) (3.06) (2.97) (2.16) (5.26) 
Liabilities-BOY 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003* 
 (in millions) (1.19) (0.36) (0.40) (2.10) 
Total Revenues 0.000** 0.000** -0.000 0.003** 
  (in millions) (6.43) (6.85) (0.36) (7.37) 
Constant 0.785** 0.864** 0.594** 0.747** 
 (176.77) (132.97) (54.89) (94.93) 
Observations 45143 7867 16991 20285 
R-squared 0.17 0.03 0.05 0.02 
T-values are in parentheses; * is significant at the 5% level, ** 
significance at the 1% level.   
 
Finally, Table 5 displays estimates of our measure of revenue diversification, the 
Herfindahl index.  Recall that the lower the index, the more diversified the revenues.  
Negative coefficients, therefore, indicate greater diversification, while positive 
coefficients signify more concentration.  Arts nonprofits  are the most diversified when 
controlling for the other independent variables, with an index score that is .164 lower, on 
average, than Human Services nonprofits, and more than .21 lower, on average, than 
Health nonprofits.  Again, variables including age, assets, and total revenues are 
significant, but small in impact.  Contrary to expectations (HD2), organizations that are 
affiliated are also slightly more diversified than their unaffiliated counterparts.  In the 
overall sample, (Column 1), we find that nonprofits classified as public are more 
concentrated than similar nonprofits categorized as mixed, while those nonprofits 
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categorized as private are slightly more diversified, on average.  This is counter to 
expectations (HD1) as we would anticipate that nonprofits with mixed public/private 
goods would be more diversified than nonprofits classified as either public or private. 
  These results, however, are not robust across the general NTEE categories.  For 
Health nonprofits, those that are private are the most concentrated, while those that are 
public are the most diversified.  For the Arts, we find that public nonprofits are more 
concentrated, on average, with index scores .076 higher than mixed Arts nonprofits.  Arts 
nonprofits classified as private exhibit greater diversification with scores .037 less than 
mixed Arts nonprofits, on average.  Finally, for Human Services, nonprofits classified as 
public are the most concentrated, with nonprofits classified as private in the middle, and 
mixed nonprofits the most diversified.  Only the latter category follows the hypothesized 
pattern. 
 
Discussion 
These results confirm a relationship between the nature of the services provided 
and the revenue streams on which nonprofits rely.  In particular, we find a clear pattern 
that nonprofits providing services that are public in nature rely more on contributions for 
their revenue base than do nonprofits whose services are private.  Alternatively, 
nonprofits offering private services rely more on earned sources of revenue.   These 
results offer general confirmation for the main hypotheses (HS1 and HS2) that a 
nonprofit organization’s revenues reflect the nature of services and benefits it produces.   
However, there are also some riddles requiring further inquiry and research.  In 
particular, separate examination of the broad subfields of nonprofits did not always 
 23
preserve the expected order of private, mixed, and public.  For example, we found that 
while private Arts nonprofits relied most on earned or program revenue, public nonprofits 
were slightly more reliant on this source than mixed nonprofits.  In all cases where the 
expected order was not preserved, the differences between mixed and the category falling 
in the middle are relatively small.  Still the results are puzzling.  One possible explanation 
is that our classification scheme failed to adequately capture the public/private nature of 
services in certain nonprofit subfields. Further study of additional NTEE categories, 
along with a reexamination and classification of those in this study, might help establish a 
more accurate continuum for the public/private nature of service provision.  Another 
explanation may pertain to the nature of particular fields of service and the coarseness of 
the data.  For example, in Human Services, substantial proportions of program revenues 
are actually paid directly or indirectly by government, implying that there may be 
substantial externalities, or perhaps redistributive goals, associated with nonprofits 
offering apparently private services.   Perhaps human services generate greater 
externalities or are unique due to the nature of their therapeutic goals or clientele, 
enabling them to rely on other sources as well as fees.  In contrast, there is relatively little 
government funding involved in the arts, suggesting that arts institutions offering public 
goods also must find enterprising ways of supporting themselves through marketable 
services for which their constituents will pay.  Better data that would permit the 
disentangling of government versus private fee support would help to investigate this 
riddle. 
  With respect to the diversification findings, results are consistently significant for 
the public and private variables, but there is no clear pattern, despite the expectation 
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(HD1) that mixed service nonprofits would be most diversified.  It may be that the 
reliability of different sources of funds varies by field.  For example, in the human 
services, funding for public type services may be reliably funded by government, 
requiring less diversification for nonprofits in this area of service, whereas in Health, 
private services are reliably funded by fees, requiring less diversification.  Additional 
research could drill into each of these fields and attempt to disentangle the interactions 
between funding source reliability and diversification for  the various public/private sub-
categories of services. 
 Another puzzle is the direction of the affiliation variable as it relates to 
diversification.  Our hypothesis (HD2) postulates that affiliation would reduce exposure 
to risk and hence moderate the impetus for diversification.  However, our results suggest 
otherwise.   It is possible that umbrella organizations provide the knowledge and a 
foundation of support to enable nonprofits to diversify their revenue sources, despite the 
possible muting of incentives that affiliation provides for protection against risk. 
  
Conclusion  
 The essential lesson of the research reported here is that the financing of nonprofit 
organizations is strongly related to the nature of the services and benefits that they 
provide.  Given the extant diversity of nonprofit services, especially their variation along 
the spectrum of public and private goods, we can understand why nonprofits finance 
themselves through so many different sources and combinations of income.  Our 
contribution here has been to connect the intrinsic character of a nonprofit’s services, as 
indicated by its NTEE subfield, to its pattern of revenue support.  This is important 
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because it confirms for the first time that previously suggested measurements of the 
collective nature of nonprofit output using ratios of contributed versus earned income do 
indeed reflect the underlying nature of services provided.  It is also important because it 
affirms a basic tenet of nonprofit fund development that is probably not sufficiently 
appreciated or exploited in practice – that a nonprofit organization should base its 
revenue strategy on the nature of benefits it provides (and hence who may be willing to 
pay). This message may conflict with some nonprofits’ desire to seek fashionable 
panaceas such as commercial ventures or building endowments through contributions.  It 
may be that nonprofits are “leaving money on the table” by failing to fully connect their 
services and benefits to their sources of finance. 
 The results here also suggest that nonprofit revenue strategy is related to risk 
management, although the ways in which this process works remains somewhat 
mysterious.  Certainly we are puzzled by the fact the mixed service nonprofits are the 
most diversified only the field of Human Services and not in Health or the Arts.  Other 
factors appear to be at work that may overwhelm diversification in those fields according 
to the nature of benefits provided.  Also especially puzzling is the strong but negative 
relationship between an organization’s affiliation with an umbrella association and its 
degree of revenue diversification, a finding that runs counter to some previous research.  
This relationship may indicate that umbrella associations encourage their members to 
manage risk more effectively rather than dull their incentives by providing a safety net. 
     The empirical approach we have taken in this research is necessarily rudimentary 
and limited by the available data, which may help account for some of the remaining 
puzzles.  An important question is why the ordering of public, mixed and private nature 
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of services is not preserved among all subfields in determining reliance on donations or 
program revenues.  While the differences that upset this logical ordering are very small, 
they remain significant and troubling.  Future efforts should replicate this research using 
other major NTEE categories and subfields and if possible, disaggregate further by 
classifying the public/private nature of output of individual nonprofits rather than 
subfields as a whole. 
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Appendix 1: 
Table A: Description of Subfields Chosen 
Field Code Subfield Number Class. Rationale 
Arts and 
Culture 
(alternative 
to Animal) 
A01 Advocacy 63 Public Non-rival, non-excludable 
benefits 
A30 – 
34 
Film, TV, 
Radio 
1963 Public Radio is the classic public 
good; other forms of media 
similar in nature 
A23 Cultural and 
Ethnic 
Awareness 
1279 Public Non-rival, non-excludable 
benefits of public education 
A25 Arts 
Education in 
Schools 
679 Mixed Private benefits to students; 
externalities for society in 
the form of public art and 
productive citizens 
A50 – 
57 
Museums 
(Various) 
2964 Mixed Private benefits to visitors; 
externalities in arts 
promotion and preservation, 
quality of community life 
A60–
A6E  
Performing 
Arts 
10130 Private Rival and excludable 
benefits accrue 
disproportionately to 
individual attendees  
      
Human 
Services 
P01 Advocacy 119 Public Non-rival, non-excludable 
benefits 
P60 - 
P62 
Emergency 
Assistance 
1285 Public Intendedly non-excludable 
and non-rival in provision 
P33 Child day 
care 
4872 Mixed Private benefits to children 
and parents; externalities in 
the form of more productive 
citizens if children perform 
better in school and are less 
likely to become 
delinquents, and if a 
parents/guardians are able 
to participate in labor force  
P40 - 
P47 
Family 
Services 
4004 Mixed Private therapeutic benefits 
for children and adults; 
external benefits to society 
in the form of healthier, 
more law-abiding and  
productive citizens 
P80 - Independence 8844 Mixed Direct private benefits to 
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P88 of “fragile 
groups” 
clients; externalities in the 
form of greater self-reliance 
and less burden on 
government and taxpayers. 
P50 - 
P52, 
P58 
Personal 
Social 
Services 
1234 Private Primarily direct  private 
benefits to clients; minimal 
external benefits to society 
in form healthier, more 
productive citizens 
      
Health  E01  Advocacy 117 Public Non-rival ,non-excludable 
benefits 
E70  Public Health 955 Public Non-rival, non-excludable 
benefits for public at large 
E42 Family 
Planning 
329 Mixed Private benefits to families; 
external benefits for society 
from preventing unwanted 
pregnancies or placement of 
infants with couples 
wanting to adopt 
E20 - 
E24 
Hospitals / 
Primary Care 
4773 Mixed Private benefits to 
individual patients; external 
benefits in form of 
reduction of communicable 
disease  
E90 & 
91 
Nursing, 
Home Health 
1738 Private Primarily private benefits to 
clients and their families, 
minor external benefits for 
other members of society in 
the form of assurance of 
availability of care. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary Statistics by Category and Classification 
 Pooled 
Sample 
Health Arts Human 
services 
Public Mixed Private 
Earned Income .415 (.399) .665 (.417) .357 (.330) .366 (.409) .235 (.343) .426 (.420) .471 (.354)
Contributions .460 (.389) .207 (.348) .473 (.332) .547 (.407) .620 (.388) .460 (.405) .387 (.329)
Diversification .754 (.212) .859 (.170) .643 (.215) .806 (.200) .780 (.215) .787 (.210) .671 (.220)
Public .127 (.334) .135 (.342) .194 (.395) .069 (.253)    
Mixed .592 (.491) .645 (.479) .236 (.425) .870 (.336)    
Private .280 (.449) .220 (.414) .571 (.495) .061 (.238)    
Organization Age 35.9 (181) 48.1 (201) 29.7 (152) 36.3 (194) 27.1 (157) 39.6 (194) 32.0 (160) 
Unaffiliated .948 (.223) .868 (.338) .972 (.166) .958 (.200) .972 (.164) .944 (.229) .943 (.231)
Assets – BOY 
 (in millions) 12.7 (109) 42.0 (250) 2.79 (28.8) 1.09 (5.63) 1.47 (12.5) 20.0 (140) 2.44 (14.0)
Liabilities-BOY 
 (in millions) 6.16 (60.6) 33.2 (141) .520 (6.60) .407 (3.36) .534 (7.61) 9.77 (78.3) 1.12 (34.0)
Total Revenues 
  (in millions) 10.7 (73.9) 55.2 (169) 1.01 (7.72) 1.60 (7.09) 1.29 (12.2) 17.0 (95.3) 1.76 (6.59)
Health .175 (.380)    .185 (.389) .190 (.392) .136 (.343)
Arts .377 (.485)    .572 (.495) .150 (.357) .766 (.423)
Human Services .449 (.497)    .243 (.429) .660 (.474) .097 (.296)
Observations  7867 (17%) 16991 (38%) 20285 (45%) 5781 (13%) 26852 (59%) 12718 (28%) 
Standard Deviation in Parentheses 
                         
 
 
 
 
